Cultural Diversity and Democracy in Post-Enlargement Europe by Blokker, Paul




Abstract. The ‘return to Europe’ of the new member states of the European Union is widely 
seen as a reunification of the ‘European family’. In this, the profound processes of 
transformation that these societies are experiencing are mostly understood as a continent-wide 
process of convergence. But such far-reaching processes of change have equally shown to 
involve forms of differentiation, in particular in terms of political and cultural diversity. Such 
differentiation has significance for the European project as such, but its implications are often 
not sufficiently acknowledged, neither in theory nor in praxis. The enlargement shows the limits 
of a conception of Europe as either a homogeneous ‘Fortress Europe’ or a ‘Europe of the 
nations’. The paper focuses in the first part on multiple forms of cultural diversity that have 
gained significance in the post-communist era. In the second part, a number of normative 
approaches to democracy in the European setting will be reviewed in order to assess to what 
extent these recognize and engage with the multiple collective identities outlined in the first 
part. On the one hand, cultural diversity will be analysed in the light of a common European 
identity, in as far as such a shared identity is deemed necessary for a European democratic 
order. On the other hand, their potential for the de-essentialization of national identities, and the 
recognition, participation, and accommodation of multiple cultural identities in European 
democracy is looked at. In the concluding section, it will be argued that both ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
approaches to a European identity and cultural diversity are unsatisfactory and that instead a 
more pluralized approach seems possible. 
 
Introduction 
The ‘return to Europe’ of the new member states of the European Union (EU) is widely 
seen as a reunification of the ‘European family’. In this, the profound processes of 
transformation that these societies are experiencing are mostly understood in terms of a 
‘banality of transition’ (Outhwaite 2006) and are basically perceived as part of a 
continent-wide process of convergence. But the far-reaching processes of European 
integration have equally shown to involve forms of differentiation, in particular in terms 
of cultural diversity. Such differentiation has significance for the European project as 
such, but its implications are often not sufficiently acknowledged, neither in theory nor 
in praxis. The processes of transformation in which the Central and Eastern European 
countries are still involved do not only affect these societies internally, for instance 
regarding different collective self-identifications, understandings of the public role of 
religion, or in dealing with the past, but in many ways also influence the rationale, 
shape, and identity-in-construction of the European project. The enlargement shows the 
limits of a conception of Europe as either a homogeneous ‘Fortress Europe’ or a 
‘Europe of the Nations’. 
The paper focuses in the first part on multiple layers of cultural diversity that have 
gained significance in the post-communist and, currently, post-enlargement era, 
distinguishing between civilizational, transnational/regional, national, and sub-national 
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collective identities. The question will be posed to what extent national identities can be 
still seen as the primary forms of collective allegiance in post-enlargement Europe, and 
whether the triangular relation between politics, identity and culture is in transformation 
(Hedetoft 1999). It will be concluded that in particular with post-communist 
transformation and European enlargement, identities are articulated and politicized on 
multiple levels rather than exclusively in the form of national identities.  
In the second part it will be asked to what extent a European democratic order is 
possible in the context of complex and multi-layered identities. Two strands of 
normative approaches to democracy in the European setting will be reviewed as to how 
these envisage the relation between European democracy and collective identity, and as 
to what extent these recognize and engage with multiple layers of collective identity. In 
the concluding section, it will be argued that both ‘communitarian’ and ‘post-
nationalist’ approaches to a European identity and cultural diversity are unsatisfactory 
and that instead a pluralized and intercultural approach is more convincing.1 
 
1. Cultural Pluralism in Post-Enlargement Europe 
The post-1989 trajectories of the Central and Eastern European countries have almost 
without exception been characterized by a widespread political consensus on the ‘return 
to Europe’. Even if it cannot be argued that the understanding of Europe is identical in 
the perceptions of the main participants, in general the new member states were driven 
by both the desire to obtain the economic and security benefits of membership, as well 
as by an aspiration to strengthen their cultural and geopolitical identities (Rogowski and 
Turner 2006: 3). Thus, arguments of identity were as important for aspirations to 
membership as economic and political ones. 
The debate on identity in Central and Eastern Europe has primarily focused on the 
unforeseen ‘return of the repressed’ or what is generally referred to as the ‘new 
nationalisms’. This revival of nationalism in the wake of the collapse of communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe has often provoked the re-emergence of a conventional 
theoretical distinction between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism in the debate on 
democratization and collective identity-formation (cf. Blokker 2005; Kuzio 2005). This 
distinction is meant to imply that the Western European trajectory to modern democracy 
and the modern nation-state involved the gradual extension of civil, political, and social 
rights in the context of a relatively consolidated and implicit collective identity, while 
the distinctive feature of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe is considered to be 
its historically explicit role in defining and promoting an ethno-culturally based 
collective identity in late-modernizing societies.2 
                                                 
1
 It might be good to emphasize here that the argument regarding forms of cultural diversity is not 
an attempt to underline cultural-determinist approaches such as Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a 
presumed ‘clash of civilizations’, which point to the incompatibility of distinct cultures with 
democracy. To the contrary, the argument is one of ‘multiple identities’ and ‘multiple democracies’ 
in that it is claimed that democracy can co-habitate with multiple historical legacies, collective 
identities, and forms of social solidarity (often, but not necessarily based on ethno-cultural forms). It 
is further argued that the quest for a universally valid democratic model seems to lead to either the 
negligence or the suppression of  significant diversity. 
2
 The re-appearing nationalisms in the former communist countries can be partially related to the 
consequence of the formal suppression of manifestations of nationalism during communism. Such a 
reading, however, foregoes the role of nationalism in the contestation of ‘international communism’ 
in a number of countries, in particular Poland (cf. Kubik 2003), or, alternatively, in its syncretism 
with communism, as in the case of, for instance, Romania (cf. Verdery 1991). 
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The most significant implication for the discussion of diversity here is that it is 
supposed that in Eastern European nationalisms the ethno-cultural component of 
collective identities has historically been dominant, and that such ethno-cultural 
nationalisms have been a dominant model of collective identity building in the post-
1989 context as well. One consequence of this seems to have been explosive inter-
ethnic conflict, in particular in former Yugoslavia but also elsewhere. Moreover, 
‘unresolved’ national identity issues have been understood as an impediment to 
democratization in these societies (Harris 2003; Spohn 2002: 200; Spohn 2005). It has 
been argued that while Western European countries are steadily moving towards a post-
national form of polity (Habermas 1998), the former communist countries are in a way 
still struggling with the intricacies and entanglements of nation-building and the 
formation of national identities, as attested by a strong emphasis on national sovereignty 
in democratization and constitutionalization processes, on the one hand, and the 
emergence of radical nationalist and populist movements, on the other (Blokker 2005). 
In the wider European context, then, the suggestion that is often made is that the former 
communist countries need to adopt a Europeanized, civic or ‘thin’ form of nationalism 
(cf. Habermas 1990; Kymlicka and Opalski 2001). 
 
The reading of post-enlargement European integration as based on a trajectory of 
convergence of the Central and Eastern European countries from an ethno-culturally 
defined national identity to a Europeanized national identity, and ultimately, post-
national form of collective identification is, however, problematic in at least two ways. 
First of all, even if the notion of a ‘return to Europe’ seems to indicate a trajectory 
towards the membership of a political community with an allegedly rather well-defined 
collective identity, no such common identification can be presupposed (cf. Strath 2003). 
In reality, a singular definition of Europe is problematic in the light of multiple forms of 
identification, including civilizational identities. Second, multiple forms of collective 
identity construction have emerged in post-communist Europe (cf. Harris 2005), 
pointing to the fact that the Europeanization of post-communist societies might not be 
only about the ‘thinning’ of ethno-cultural nationalism but also about the recognition of 
various other collective identities and forms of identification. Multiple identities 
(Europe, the nation, the region) are sometimes mutually exclusive, but are often also 
overlapping, entangled, or nested. 
Thus, with regard to the first point, rather than assuming the return of the former 
communist societies to a Europe with a clearly defined identity, it might be argued that 
a singular civilizational identity of post-enlargement Europe is untenable in the post-
enlargement European Union. It was not least the constitutionalization process of 
Europe that commenced with the Convention on the Future of Europe that brought the 
question of a common European identity on the political agenda. And while in the 
debate over the European Constitution a singular European civilizational background is 
often invoked (based on Roman and Judeo-Christian heritages, the Enlightenment, and 
the French Revolution), it cannot be denied that post-enlargement Europe is based on a 
multiple civilizational background. Gerard Delanty thus argues for an understanding of 
post-enlargement Europe as ‘post-Western’ (Delanty 2003), in that it has become 
increasingly difficult to ground a common European identity in the notion of a singular 
civilizational background of a Western European civilization that has characterized and 
underpinned European integration until 2004. In the post-enlargement order, it has to be 
recognised that the member states that make up the European order represent different 
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trajectories to modernity, have experienced different civilizational influences 
(Byzantine, Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian), all of which might be seen as European in 
various ways, and that the European historical legacy is composed of diverse 
civilizational influences and encounters. From this perspective, it might make sense to 
speak of multiple Europes rather than Europe in the singular (Delanty 2006a; Strath 
2000). 
Post-enlargement Europe can thus be neither seen as the ‘home of civilization’ (Strath 
2000: 69-71), nor as the inheritor of a more or less singular civilizational background in 
the form of Ancient Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian origins, and a set of European 
values (democracy, the constitutional state and the rule of law). Rather, Europe needs to 
confront multiple cultural and religious legacies, related forms of belonging and 
identification, as well as distinct experiences with modernity that inform collective 
identities, political cultures, and forms of democracy. While these multiple civilizational 
identities problematize a singular European identity in terms of a longue durée reading 
of Europe, various other - including supranational and subnational identities – also 
question such an identity if it is to mean a homogeneous identity and a singular set of 
shared norms and values in, let us say, a Durkheimian kind of  'conscience collective'. 
Regarding the second point, while ethno-cultural understandings of national identity 
have generally been seen as constituting the dominant mode of collective identification 
and societal integration in the post-communist area, in reality developments after 1989 
have shown the proliferation of multiple collective identifications, which points to 
wider and more complex processes of collective identity construction (Batt 2002). In 
this sense, European integration and the enlargement to include the former communist 
societies can only be understood by using a ‘multi-layered constellation model’, in 
which Europeanized identities, as well as civilizational, transnational, national, and 
regional identities are understood as interlinked (cf. Spohn 2005: 4; Ichijo and Spohn 
2005). 
In post-enlargement Europe, constructions of collective identities can be observed on 
various ‘relational or spatial dimensions’ (Ichijo and Spohn 2005: 5), including sub- and 
transnational levels, thereby contradicting an ‘evolutionary’ reading of European 
integration from ethno-national to civic-national to post-national identifications (cf. Batt 
2002). On a transnational, regional level, cross-border regional identities are 
reconstructed that are sometimes in tension with national identities, and which are based 
on historical regions that were once part of an empire, and are now divided between 
various nation-states as a result of the collapse of these empires (e.g., the Banat is 
divided between Hungary, Romania and Serbia, while the Bukovina is divided between 
the Ukraine and Romania).3 On a wider geographical level one finds transnational 
meso-regions or what in historiography is often called ‘historical regions’ (see Troebst 
2003). These meso-regions comprise various states and are invoked to group families of 
societies sharing a number of similar features and historical experiences.4 On the 
                                                 
3
 In the context of European integration, it is interesting to observe that in some cases the national 
states to which these regions formally belong are bypassed by regional movements in favour of the 
European Union, which is seen as more sensitive to issues of regional autonomy and interregional 
collaboration (see Wolczuk 2002; see also Cordell and Wolff 2004). Cross-border regional identities 
can in some cases be the basis of clear defiance of a majoritarian national state while demanding 
some form of regional autonomy, but can also constitute a different layer to national identity. 
4
 In the post- communist context, perhaps the most well-known of such meso-regions is ‘Central 
Europe’. Central European identity is often seen as based on a common historical experience of a 
number of small nations with the Habsburg empire, from which a distinct Central-European culture 
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subnational level, minorities invoke subnational and local identities, in concomitance 
with claims for (limited) autonomy vis-à-vis national states. As a result of late state-
formation and nation-building in the Central and Eastern European region, and the 
emergence of many of the precursors of the current nation-states or their successors out 
of the collapsed Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires after the First World War, 
one finds a relatively high number of minority groups5 of which some do not consider 
themselves as belonging to their ‘host’ state (or, at least, according to their elites) 
(Brubaker 1996; Cordell and Wolff 2004; Culic 2007).6  
 
The current EU is then not only dealing with the integration of nation-states, which can 
politically be dealt with by means of some kind of intergovernmentalism, but more and 
more also with cultural integration and the politics of identity.7 Cultural integration in 
Europe not only touches upon questions of rights and democratic governance, for 
instance regarding the inclusion of minority as well as regional groups, but also upon 
the problématique of a common European identity, the alleged need for a set of 
common European values, and their relation with multiple identities, ‘united in 
diversity’ . 
The most significant question concerns how the European integration project is to deal 
with democracy and pan-European social solidarity in a post-national European order 
based on complex, multi-level cultural diversity. It is argued in this paper that this 
question cannot relate to the construction of a European common identity as the 
substitution of a European identity for various collective identities, but that a post-
national political order needs to find a democratic way to take into account both national 
and other identities as well (cf. Brighenti 2007). The questions that arise in such a 
context are that of the balance between a European identity and various other identities 
(national, regional), the relation between identity and democracy, and the possibility of 
a pluralized European identity or an identity based on dialogue. 
 
2. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 
Even if the above-sketched forms of cultural diversity in post-enlargement Europe are 
widely acknowledged, they are mostly regarded as falling within the ‘parameters’ of 
                                                                                                                                               
and mode of co-habitation is derived (see Blokker forthcoming). Another example regards the 
Balkans, situated in South-Eastern Europe, a regional denomination that has clearly acquired a 
number of distinct negative connotations, not least related to its civilizational past (see Todorova 
1997), and is often imposed on the region, rather than being a form of self-identification. What 
makes meso-regional identities salient for a discussion of diversity and European integration is that 
in a number of instances such regional ideas have been instrumentalized as a means of 
differentiation in the accession process (cf. Blokker 2006, forthcoming; Neumann 2001; Todorova 
1997). Most prominently, such differentiation has been created between ‘Central Europe’, on the 
one hand, and ‘South-Eastern Europe’ or the Balkans, and ‘Eastern Europe’ proper, on the other. 
Such differentiation has not necessarily supported a common European project, but rather involved 
exclusivist notions of a Central Europe closer to an ideal of European civilization (Kuus 2004). 
Regional identities can thus underpin conflictive and exclusivist visions of European identity and of 
what European integration is about, although such identities might similarly inform more open and 
tolerant understandings of Europe, as in a ‘multi-cultural’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ reading of the notion of 
a Central European identity (Betz 1990; Blokker forthcoming; Delanty 1996). 
5
 As Toggenburg (2006) argues, the Eastern Enlargement was a ‘primordial catalyst’ in putting 
minority rights protection on the European agenda. 
6
 Brubaker distinguishes between those minorities that have a neighbouring kinstate (such as the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania) and national minorities (Brubaker 1996). 
7
 The Preamble of the European Draft Constitution refers indeed to peoples rather than states. 
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already existing diversity, and are mostly not deemed a fundamental challenge to the 
direction of the European project itself (cf. Outhwaite 2006). The idea that the 
enlargement does not change the conditions and call for a redefinition of the European 
project seems, however, inattentive of at least some of the manifestations of diversity 
mentioned above. The incorporation of the Central and Eastern European societies, of 
multiple forms of identity (majority, minority, subnational, transnational) and of various 
historical experiences, implies that the European project reinvestigates its finalité and 
acknowledges a complex constellation of cultural diversity as a structural element of 
Europe (cf. Rogowski and Turner 2006).8  
Cultural diversity in its various manifestations and implications have hardly been at 
the centre of attention of European policy-makers (even if there is an increasing 
attention for minority protection and regionalism, see Toggenburg 2004) nor, so it 
seems, of those implicated with the study of the emerging European order. Among the 
first one can find both the evolutionary optimism of those that adhere to functionalist 
and federalist visions of Europe, which is to result in an ‘ever closer union’, and the 
scepticism of those who tend to confine diversity mostly to the national level, therefore 
understood as without implications for Europe as such (‘Europe of the Nations’). 
The ever-growing scholarly community that studies Europe has largely taken two 
different views of integration. Many approaches ultimately take a conventional statist or 
‘Westphalian’ vision of Europe and seem to have difficulty in incorporating other than 
national manifestations of diversity (cf. Kraus 2003). A second reading, most promising 
in Habermas’s cosmopolitan idea of a post-national European polity, goes quite some 
way in recognizing and accommodating various forms of diversity. Nevertheless, as I 
will argue, also Habermas’s post-national democracy ultimately seems too restrictive to 
be able to deal satisfactorily with the cultural diversity of post-enlargement Europe. 
 
In most political theoretical approaches that analyze the European project, the nation-
state looms large as the primary unit of the European order. The statist vision, in one of 
its most diffused guises, consists of the idea that Europe is ultimately based on a union 
of nation-states, in which the former is structurally incapable of assuming the political 
and democratic competences of the latter. Statist approaches thus analyze the European 
project in close analogy with the Westphalian nation-state (cf. Kraus 2003). 
The normative equation of democracy with the nation-state form is mostly 
accompanied by a number of assumptions derived from the historical experience of the 
West-European nation-state. In statist readings, the EU would need to live up to the 
political and democratic achievements of the nation-state in order to be viable and 
legitimate. Significant examples of this are the ideas that a European order can only be 
legitimate when a European people or demos is formed which shares a common 
language and a set of commonly held values, or when a sufficient level of social trust 
between European citizens has developed.9 Dieter Grimm has, for instance, argued that 
                                                 
8
 As Gabriel Toggenburg has argued, ‘[t]hrough enlargement, the European Union will find itself in 
direct contact with new neighbours such as Russia, Ukraine or Byelorussia, which from a "Western" 
perspective used to be vaguely located in very distant places somewhere in “the East”. From this 
point on, cultural horizons will have to be expanded, traditional stereotypes held up for critical 
assessment. The Union must get to know a more complete (and more complex) story of Europe’s 
historic heritage - one that reflects the views on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. With May 
2004, the two notions of "we" and "the others" are getting seriously reshuffled’ (Toggenburg 2004). 
9
 See, most prominently, Grimm (1995); and Offe (2000); see for a critique of such visions, Friese 
and Wagner (2001). 
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a European democratic order lacks a ‘political substructure’, in the form of a public 
sphere integrated by language and a collective identity, which are necessary to socially 
embed a European democratic institutional order (Grimm 1995: 294-7). And according 
to Claus Offe, the European order is unable to reproduce the necessary mutual feelings 
of trust and solidarity as they exist between national citizens:  
the conclusion seems inescapable that a repertoire of social norms capable of supporting a more 
“intentionalistic” paradigm of European integration does not currently exist. Moreover, 
independence and the division of labour will not automatically generate this trust and solidarity, 
anymore than social integration, in the sense of the convergence of social norms and cognitive 
orientation, will flow naturally from the integration of national systems through trade and factors of 
mobility (Offe 2000: 19). 
The statist vision assumes that a ‘thick’ form of cultural commonality, which sometimes 
risks lapsing into essentialist understandings of a singular collective identity,10 is 
necessary for the creation of a feeling of belonging and solidarity without which a 
viable and stable democracy would not be possible. In normative political theory, such a 
strong link between national identity and democracy often takes the shape of ‘liberal 
nationalism’. One of the most arduous defenders of such an understanding of 
nationalism is Will Kymlicka, according to whom ‘national units’ are necessarily the 
primary units in a democracy as well as in the European order. In this vein, Kymlicka 
has for instance suggested that the European integration project faces an almost 
insurmountable democratic problem as the result of its pluri-lingualism, as this inhibits 
the construction of a European ‘public opinion’ necessary for genuine democratic 
participation (see Kymlicka 2001: 214, approvingly citing Dieter Grimm). Moreover, 
the nation-state, according to Kymlicka, is bound to remain the main unit of 
legitimation in European integration (2001: 214-15). 
On Kymlicka’s account, the significance of a national identity and culture11 for 
democracy consists in the fact that it provides a common language for communication 
and a system of meaning in order to make meaningful choices; national identity thus 
provides individual citizens with meaning, means of communication, and a distinct 
identity. For Kymlicka, a democratic order can only genuinely exist if a common space 
for communication based on a shared language exists and shared historical traditions 
underpin a sense of solidarity. The cultural system of meaning allows the individual to 
be free and to be able to exercise his/her autonomy. And only in the context of a shared 
language and history can a sufficient basis for trust and solidarity develop, and can a 
reciprocal political culture emerge that comprises public-spiritedness, a sense of justice, 
and recognition of and respect for the rights of others (Kymlicka 2001; cf. Brock 2002). 
But Kymlicka is aware of the cultural complexities of modern societies which cannot 
be easily grounded in one national culture. As modern, complex societies almost 
invariably need to accommodate various minority cultures within the common political 
community, ways need to be found in which such pluralism can be incorporated without 
leading to the suppression of difference nor to the fragmentation of the political order. 
Kymlicka identifies two viable ways of achieving these aims (apart from the generally  
less viable ways of out-migration or marginalization of minorities): assimilation into the 
majority societal culture, and the recognition of distinct rights and powers for minority 
                                                 
10
 See Friese and Wagner (2001:  352) and Kohli (2000: 117). 
11
 A ‘societal culture’, in Kymlicka’s terms, consists of a ‘territorially concentrated culture, centred 
on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and 
private life’ (see 2001: 209, fn 5). 
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nations (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001: 23). In both cases, the democratic order is 
ultimately to be held together by a shared political culture, based on the liberal values of 
reciprocal tolerance and respect. Kymlicka suggests that thereby a national-liberal 
model continues to have relevance for modern, multi-cultural societies if it can create an 
equilibrium, based on a shared liberal political culture, between various recognized 
‘national’ cultures within a ‘multination’ state.12 
Kymlicka’s liberal-nationalist model focuses, on the one hand, on the integrative 
function of national culture(-s) and, on the other, on a shared liberal political culture 
regulating state-society relations and those between different nations in multination 
states. There are two main problems with such a ‘nationalist’ model, in particular when 
used to evaluate a potential European democratic order (as Kymlicka does, for instance, 
in Kymlicka 2001). First of all, Kymlicka assumes that the classical, Westphalian 
relation between culture, identity, and politics is the only viable way of grounding a 
modern democratic order. He confines democratic self-expression and self-
determination to expression within a homogeneous cultural sphere in which a ‘societal 
culture’ is shared. Therefore, when he is considering a possible future European 
democratic regime, he assumes that since a European society that is bounded by a 
common ‘vernacular’ and shared traditions does not (yet) exist, a post-national 
democratic regime is impossible to realize (Kymlicka 2001: 324-25). His equation of 
meaningful culture with national culture is problematic, however, in that such a 
‘modernist’ reading of culture foregoes its ultimately constructed nature (cf. Benhabib 
2002: 66; Pensky 2000; Walzer 1994; 2002). In other words, there is no a priori reason 
why a meaningful and shared European identity could not emerge (this is not to deny 
that this might be a long and a complicated process). In addition, and contrary to 
Kymlicka’s own remarks, his multinational democracy, if read as the interaction of 
various nations within one political community held together by a ‘thin’ liberal political 
culture, seems to be one way of describing a minimal democracy on the European level, 
rather than to contradict it.  
Second, and in a related but slightly different sense, Kymlicka’s model seems blind to 
the relation of democracy with other (more complex) identities and cultural 
manifestations than national ones,13 or, alternatively, with democratic models that do 
not need his nation-based definition of culture, or any ‘thick’ form of identity for that 
matter. In this, Kymlicka’s critique of post-national and cosmopolitan models seems 
based on a rather conservative and unimaginative stance rather than a careful 
consideration of emerging - potentially innovative - forms of, for instance, democracy 
on the European level. In the light of the multiple and overlapping cultural identities 
emerging in Europe, it seems not wholly utopian to argue for a kind of ‘meta-identity’ 
that is based on a continuous dialogue between different and multiple identities, rather 
than for a traditional identity based on a singular and homogeneous set of commonly 
shared values.14 
 
                                                 
12
 It is not clear, though, how the various nations come to desire to ‘hold together’ in their deep 
diversity and to share a liberal political culture (Parekh 2000: 104). Kymlicka points to a strong 
sense of mutual identification and the valuing of diversity, but is not able to clarify the historical 
circumstances under which such values emerge (Kymlicka 1995: 190-1).   
13
 For instance, concerning groups that are territorially dispersed rather than concentrated in a 
singular territory. 
14
 One historical analogy for such a ‘meta-identity’ has been suggested in the form of a ‘Central 
European’, multi-cultural identity (see Betz 1990; Blokker forthcoming; Delanty 1996). 
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Post-national Democracy 
A second reading, that of ‘constitutional patriotism’ and ‘post-national democracy’, is 
more sensitive to diversity and innovative forms of democracy, and is most prominently 
reflected in Jürgen Habermas’ idea of a polity founded on a popular allegiance to the 
values of the constitution. Habermas has on various occasions suggested the relevance 
of such a model for the emerging European political community.15 Habermas’ idea of 
constitutional patriotism, in concomitance with the notion of a – procedurally instituted 
- public sphere based on unrestricted deliberation in which citizens debate on questions 
of common significance, is unquestionably a major step forward in the political 
theoretical imagination of a (European) polity in which political and cultural diversity 
can be accustomed. 
In such a deliberative model, it seems that problems of the denial or suppression of 
cultural diversity are effectively transcended by means of a focus on rational-critical 
discourse rather than on identities and social status. The essentialism and particularism 
of nationalist and statist approaches to (European) culture and a (European) collective 
identity is avoided as the model of deliberative democracy is based on a universal 
morality in which issues of identity and cultural difference are transcended, while public 
reason is based on impartiality and neutrality. While Habermas acknowledges that 
‘national myths’ have had emancipatory and inclusionary features, he equally 
underlines their discriminating and aggressive aspects in that the nation as a myth or 
‘imagined community’ has fed the idea of ‘collective freedom’ which can be (and has 
historically been) used to override individual freedoms and suppress diversity.16 In 
order to promote equality and inclusion, therefore, collective identities and ethical 
visions are ‘bracketed’ (Calhoun 1995: 244), that is, they are perceived as belonging to 
the private sphere,17 in order to avoid their political instrumentalization and the 
domination by the national majority over minority groups on their basis. 
According to Habermas, politics should not be confined to self-exploration or the 
definition of a collective identity, but rather needs to be grounded in widely shared 
constitutional principles. This shared political culture or ‘common horizon of 
interpretation’ forms the framework within which citizens debate on matters of 
collective interest. Habermas sustains that complex societies can only be held together 
by such a ‘procedural consensus’ as a substantive consensus over values cannot be 
upheld in pluralized modern societies (Habermas 1994a: 134-35). The universalist 
vision of constitutional consensus, which seeks to transcend the ambivalent features of 
nationalisms and collectivisms, fits clearly very well with one of the main rationales of 
European integration, in which Europe is a primary means of overcoming the horrors of 
the nationalisms of the World Wars.  
                                                 
15
 See, for instance, Habermas 1998; 2001. 
16
 The argumentation of Habermas is twofold. On the one hand, he points to the historically 
ambivalent function that nationalism has had in Western Europe, i.e., as socially integrating and 
stimulating social solidarity but at the same time as an exclusivist force. In this sense, he argues for 
the ‘shaking off’ of its ambivalence. On the other hand, Habermas designates ‘national myths’ as a 
‘non-secularised remainder’ in secularised states, which prevents rational deliberation of the 
citizens, as the pre-political nature of an organic nation or Volk constitutes an element that is formed 
independently of the political formation of opinion and will of the citizen, (Habermas 1999: 138-39, 
141-42). 
17
 ‘The level of a common political culture needs to be detached from the level of subcultures and 
their pre-politically formed identities’ (Habermas 1999: 142). 
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Habermas’ idea of constitutional patriotism is, however, not without problems and 
seems to be too limited exactly in the fields of cultural diversity and political conflict 
over values. It has been argued that, even if Habermas is able to avoid a number of 
important problems related to the imposition of a majority culture on minorities of 
various kinds, his universalist model ultimately is unable to deal with conflict over deep 
principles and cultural diversity.18 With regard to the diversity of cultural identities and 
life forms, Habermas’ theory has ‘difficulty in answering new cross-cultural challenges, 
such as Islamic modernity, the politics of identity associated with new social 
movements, and, above all, the politics of reconciliation in deeply divided societies’.19 
This line of argument might be of importance with regard to Central and Eastern 
European societies as well as various minority groups in the region, which experienced 
a historical development different from that of the West, have (re-)constructed, ask 
recognition for, and want to preserve different collective identities (often including 
different civilizational and modern components), are in some cases attached to different 
values, and often have to confront deeply divided multi-ethnic societies.  
First, while Habermas’s ideas of ‘post-national democracy’ and ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ avoid the trappings of statism, ‘national liberalism’, as well as exclusionary 
collective identities, the post-national model might be said to be bypassing the historical 
context of the transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. While Habermas’s model 
grew out of a necessity to transcend the particularist nationalisms that had threatened to 
destroy Europe altogether,20 and certainly has relevance for countering those 
manifestations of exclusivist, violent nationalisms that emerged after 1989 (such as in 
former Yugoslavia, but also, in a much less violent form, in many other countries, such 
as Slovakia and Romania), the move to a ‘thin’, shared political culture in which no 
reference to particularist, cultural values is possible might prove too thin to be relevant 
for the reconstruction of the former communist societies.21 It seems that at least some 
form of particularist understanding of togetherness or ‘background consensus’ is needed 
to embed such a form of ‘constitutional patriotism’, something that Habermas admits to 
himself when he sees adherence to constitutional values as in need of grounding in a 
particular historical context (see Habermas 1994a). Neither the option of  bypassing the 
question of self-definition by directly adhering to a set of constitutional principles nor 
the jump to a post-national, European identity seem to be feasible or realistic. The post-
1989 reconstructions are not only about the rejection of the heteronomy of Soviet 
domination, but also about refinding ways of self-expression. But while Kymlicka 
essentializes national cultures, Habermas seems to understand any form of collective 
identity as inherently irrational and exclusionary and, therefore, unfit for participation in 
                                                 
18
 Cf. Bohmann (1995); for a different vision, see Benhabib (2002). 
19
 See Delanty (1997:  30). 
20
 Habermas’s model of ‘constitutional patriotism’ has been often exposed as strictly related to the 
specific West-German postwar trajectory. Constitutional patriotism provided a way of transcending 
the problematic, fascist past, and firmly anchored democracy in the constitution ([Turner 2004]; 
Müller 2006: 378). Post-national democracy is then predominantly a reflection on the postwar 
experiences of West-Germany, and to a certain extent the wider Western European experience (cf. 
Habermas 1999: 144). 
21
 In this regard, it is indeed somewhat paradoxical that while Western European societies are 
apparently moving to a post-national form of social solidarity, the former communist societies are 
dealing with the foundational question of who they are. A simple skipping of this ’national 
question’ by means of the adherence to universalist constitutional principles seems in that light not 
feasible. 
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rational political deliberation (cf. Breda 2004; Pensky 2000). But the recently regained 
national sovereignty and concomitant search for and construction of social identities in 
the former communist societies not only to involve the manifestation of exclusivist, 
repressive, and closed forms of ethnic nationalism, but also milder, more open, and 
Europeanist forms of communitarian understandings of identity and liberal forms of 
social identities. In his understanding of constitutional patriotism and a concomitant 
political culture, Habermas does not, however, not seem to leave much room for the 
expression of either open and relatively fluid manifestations of collective identities nor 
for multiple identities for that matter, the latter which may include attachments to the 
locality, the nation as well more cosmopolitan inclinations to Europe at the same time 
(cf. Calhoun 1994: 327). The issue is then perhaps not so much how to overcome forms 
of collective identity and nationalism, but rather how to create open, tolerant, and cross-
cultural forms of collective identification. 
A second problem with Habermas’s model it that is too much the expression of a 
singular reading of modernity, thereby largely bypassing the question of ‘multiple 
modernities’, their relationship with different civilizational backgrounds, and connected 
conceptualizations of the relation between culture and politics. While it might be said 
that the collapse of communism eliminated the rivalry between two alternative forms of 
modernity, the diversity of transformation pathways of the successor states to the Soviet 
empire point to the importance of historical legacies and different experiences with 
modernity (Arnason 2000: 5). Habermas’s response to the collapse of communism has 
been that 
the revolutionary process in the GDR and in East-Central Europe hold onto our passions, even 
though the original enthusiasm has given place to fear and skepticism. The events change the 
international and inter-German scene nearly daily. But the catching-up revolution throws no 
new light on our old problems (Habermas 1990: 7). 
Habermas has confirmed such a view in later moments (see, e.g., Habermas 1994b) and 
regards the transformations of the former communist countries basically as the 
‘catching-up’ with the ideals of the Enlightenment and French Revolution. Habermas’s 
characterization of a democratic political culture is based on the profound change in 
political mentality that was the result of the French Revolution, that is, the development 
of a future-oriented consciousness, a new understanding of political praxis as self-
determination and self-realization, and a new form of post-metaphysical legitimation 
(Habermas 1992: 603-608). While such a political culture on the European level would 
in many ways be appealing for its inclusionary and participative nature, it might prove 
to be rather intolerant of those (including non-liberal) visions of democracy that do not 
fully share such a political mentality. 
One problematic aspect concerns, for instance, different perceptions of the role of 
religion in public life and politics. One instance of this might be the role of Orthodox 
Christianity in a number of South-Eastern European countries, such as Romania. 
Orthodox culture has not been touched by modernizing forces in the same way as 
Western Christianity, and in that sense has not been object to the process of 
secularization in the same way. It has in this regard been argued that one might 
distinguish a Western European modernity but also a South-Eastern European, 
Orthodoxy modernity (Dungaciu 2004). It can further be argued that the relation of 
orthodoxy with democracy is by no means a clear-cut issue (Papanikolaou 2003). While 
the conventional argument is that democracy and orthodoxy are incompatible (see, in 
particular, Huntington 1992), particular interpretations of orthodox culture are rather 
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close to communitarian understandings of democracy, and it seems not unreasonable to 
argue for an orthodox form of pluralism (see Duu 1995: 151-53). The revival of 
religion in the post-communist era indicates a different relation of citizens to religion, 
and of state-church relations. Rather than subjecting the new members states to a 
secularised and post-metaphysical understanding of democracy and the public sphere, it 
might be better to perceive of a European political culture as a ‘post-secular’ culture 
(Delanty forthcoming). 
 
3. Post-National Democracy in the Enlarged European Union 
Both the statist version of Europe with its relatively ‘thick’, value-based understanding 
of commonality grounded in the nation-state and the post-national, rights-based 
perception of Europe with its ‘thin’ attachment to a common constitutional project 
provide important recognition for and explicitly engage with cultural pluralism. 
However, as has been argued here, both fall short in dealing with cultural diversity in 
post-enlargement Europe in a comprehensive and ultimately convincing way, in 
particular with regard to the experiences of the Central and Eastern European societies. 
The statist reading of modern democracy, here analysed mostly in the form of 
Kymlicka’s ‘multicultural liberalism’, is arguing for the continuing relevance of the 
nation-state in sustaining modern democracy, in that the liberal right to nation-building 
is extended to nations other than the majority nation. From this national point of view, 
Kymlicka argues for the impossibility of European democracy, mostly in a form of the 
well-known ‘no-demos’-thesis. By claiming that modern democracy is only possible on 
the national level, Kymlicka only recognizes the nation as a significant cultural identity 
(cf. Young 1997) and basis of social solidarity, to the detriment of other forms of 
identity (including post-national multiple forms, based on local, regional, or 
supranational identities, or religion). By prioritizing the nation as the primary form of 
identity, Kymlicka essentializes national identity and, at the same time, portrays it as a 
coherent, commonly shared identity. In this way, neither other cultural identities, nor 
any intra-national differences are sufficiently taken into account (cf. Benhabib 2002: 
60). Kymlicka’s naturalising of the nation further leads him to deny the possibility of 
democracy beyond the nation-state, even if, as Habermas and, most famously, Anderson 
have argued (Anderson 1983; Habermas 1998), the nation is itself a constructed 
identity, which at least not excludes the possibility of the construction of other forms of 
identity.  
While Kymlicka’s project is to modernize and extent liberalism so as to include the 
complex pluralism of modern society, rehabilitating the nation as an undeniable 
component of modern democracy along the way, Habermas’s theory addresses the same 
problem from a very different angle. His ‘constitutional patriotism’ constitutes – at least 
in one reading of it – an attempt to reconcile democracy with the modern fact of cultural 
pluralism and the impossibility of organizing modern society around a singular set of 
substantive values. But rather than reifying the nation Habermas seeks to overcome 
national, ethical-political forms of identification in favour of a post-national form of 
democracy centred on universal, constitutional values. But in this he eschews any form 
of belonging and social identity, making his theory too formal and abstract to be reality-
proof.22 And while his model of deliberative democracy is clearly much more inclusive 
                                                 
22
 This is probably the reason why Habermas simultaneously and paradoxically insists on the 
necessity of the historical embedment of constitutional allegiance (see Habermas 1994, 2006; 
Pensky 2000). 
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and participatory than many other democratic models, it might be said to be too much 
wedded to a Eurocentric reading of the emergence of (the public sphere in) modern 
democracy in the first place to be sensitive to possible other ‘democratization roads’. 
This is then a second instance in which Habermas’s model is not reality-proof in 
contemporary post-Enlargement Europe.  
The fifth wave of enlargement is not only about the ‘return to Europe’ of a number of 
always already European countries, nor simply about the ‘catching up with missed 
developments’ of these countries (Habermas 1990: 180). The post-enlargement order 
faces the challenge of finding a common denominator for deeper political integration 
while acknowledging Europe’s political and cultural plurality. I have argued that such 
plurality is more complex in the post-enlargement order in that there is currently a clear 
need for an open confrontation with the multiple civilizational past as well as various 
routes to modernity, the relations of these routes to multiple political forms and cultural 
identities, and a mosaic of complex cultural identities. The future of European 
integration is not merely concerned with the political assimilation of the new member 
states to either a post-national, rights-based vision or a national, value-based 
understanding of the European political order. Rather, Europe needs to find ways to, on 
the one hand, engage with, accommodate, and transform multiple cultural differences 
and identities, as might be derived from one way of reading the notion of ‘unity in 
diversity’, and incorporate multiple democratic discourses and practices, on the other. A 
post-national understanding of a common European identity clearly cannot be settled in 
terms of a fixed set of norms and values and needs to go beyond the idea that 
democracy on the European level can only exist on such a basis. But neither the idea 
that a European identity can only be grounded in a political culture of abstract principles 
shared by all, while national and sub-national identities are ‘bracketed’, is relevant to 
the post-enlargement situation. Instead, a European common identity should be based 
on inclusion and participation in open deliberation about such an identity, stimulating 
dialogue on distinct values and in order to further cross-group identification. A 
democratic European order should not be based on the idea that the quest for democracy 
has now ended with the discovery of one or the other ideal-typical order. Instead, 
deliberative democracy should be based on an understanding of democratic praxis that 








The author acknowledges an EU Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship at the 
University of Liverpool. 
 
Bibliography 
Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 
London: Verso. 
Arnason, J. (2000), ‘Globalism, Ideology, and Traditions. Interview with Jürgen Habermas’, in: Thesis 
Eleven, 63, pp. 1-10. 
Batt, J. (2002), ‘Introduction: Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe, in: J. Batt and K. 
Wolczuk (eds), Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe, London: Frank Cass and Co. 
Benhabib, S. (2002), The claims of culture: equality and diversity in the global era, Princeton/N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Betz, Hans-Georg (1990) ‘Mitteleuropa and Post-Modern European Identity’, in: New German Critique, 
50, pp. 173-92. 
Blokker, P. (2005), ‘Populist Nationalism, Anti-Europeanism, Post-Nationalism, and the East-West 
Distinction’, in: ‘Confronting Memories: European “Bitter Experiences” and the Constitutionalisation 
Process’, Special Issue, co-edited with Christian Joerges, German Law Journal, 6(2). 
— (2006), ‘Romania as the Intersection of Different Europes: Implications and Consequences for the 
Other Europe’, paper for the conference “European Unity and Division: Regions, Religions, 
Civilisations”, Centre for European Studies/Monash University and European University Institute, 
Prato Italy. 
— (forthcoming), ‘The “unity in diversity” of enlarged Europe: Central Europe as an ambiguous 
contribution’, in: Special Issue ‘Mitteleuropa: Some Opening Reflections on a Concept’ (edited by Bo 
Strath and Patricia Chiantera-Stutte), in: European Journal of Social Theory. 
Bohman, J. (1995), ‘Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral 
Conflict’, in: Political Theory, 23(2), pp. 253-279. 
Breda, V. (2004), ‘The Incoherence of the Patriotic State: A Critique of “Constitutional Patriotism” ‘, in: 
Res Publica, 10, pp. 247–265. 
Brighenti, A. (2007), ‘Migrants as the real Europeans’, in: Sortuz, Oñati Journal of Emergent Socio-legal 
Studies, 1(1), pp. 34-49, available online: 
http://www.iisj.net/antCatalogo.asp?cod=3872&nombre=3872&prt=1&nodo=3879&sesion=1347. 
Brock, G. (2002), ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy and Justice: Held versus Kymlicka’, in: Studies in East 
European Thought, 54, pp. 325–347. 
Brubaker, R. (1996), Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Calhoun, C. (1994), ‘Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination’, in: 
C. Calhoun (ed.), Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, Oxford, UK/Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 
pp. 304-336. 
— (1995), Critical social theory. Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference, Oxford, 
UK/Cambridge, USA: Blackwell. 
Cordell, K. and S. Wolff (2004), ‘Introduction: Ethnopolitics in Contemporary Europe’, in: K. Cordell 
and S. Wolff (eds), The Ethnopolitical Encyclopaedia of Europe, Pallgrave/MacMillan. 
Culic, I. (2007), ‘Dual Citizenship in Eastern Europe’, paper presented at the 2007 World Convention, 
Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), Columbia University.  
Delanty, G. (1995) Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. Basingstoke: MacMillan. 
— (1996) ‘The Resonance of Mitteleuropa. A Habsburg Myth or Antipolitics?’, in: Theory, Culture, and 
Society 13(4), pp. 93-108. 
— (1997) ‘Habermas and occidental rationalism: the politics of identity, social learning and the cultural 
limits of moral universalism’, in: Sociological Theory 15(3), pp. 30-50. 
— (2003) , “The Making of a Post-Western Europe: A Civilizational Analysis”, in: Thesis Eleven, 72 ,pp. 
8-25.  
 15 
— (2006a), ’The Civilizational Consequences of Enlargement’, in: R. Rogowski and C. Turner (eds.), 
The Shape of the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, pp. 125-145. 
— (forthcoming), ‘Dilemmas of Secularism: Europe, Religion and the Problem of Pluralism’, in: G. 
Delanty, P. Jones and R. Wodak (eds), Migrant Voices: Discourses of Belonging and Exclusion, 
Liverpool University Press. 
Dungaciu, D. (2004), ‘Alternative Modernities in Europe. Modernity, Religion and Secularization in 
South-Eastern Europe: the Romanian Case’, Working Paper No. 68, Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute 
for Social Anthropology. 
Duu, A. (1995), ‘Traditional toleration and modern pluralism: the case of “Orthodox Europe” ‘, in: East 
European Quarterly, 29:2, pp. 143-55. 
Friese, H. and P. Wagner (2001), ‘Survey article: the nascent political philosophy of the European polity’, 
in: Journal of Political Philosophy 10(3), pp. 342-64. 
Grimm, D. (1995), ‘Does Europe need a constitution?’, in: European Law Journal, 1, pp. 282-302. 
Habermas, J. (1990), Die nachholende Revolution,  Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. 
— (1992), Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen 
Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
— (1994a), ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, in: C. Taylor (edited by 
Amy Gutmann), Multiculturalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 107-48. 
—  (1994b), The Past as Future, Interviewed by Michael Haller, Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska 
Press. 
—  (1998), Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
— (1999), Die Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie, Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 
—  (2001). ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, in: New Left Review, 11, pp. 5-26. 
— (2006), ‘Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic 
Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research’, in: Communication Theory, 16, 
pp. 411-426. 
Harris, E. (2003), ‘New Forms of Identity in Contemporary Europe’, in: Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society, 4:1, pp. 13-33. 
— (2005), ‘Moving Politics Beyond the State? The Impact of European Integration on the Hungarian 
Minority in Slovakia’, Working Paper EWC/2005/01, Europe in the World Centre, University of 
Liverpool. 
Hedetoft, U. (1999), ‘The Nation-state Meets the World. National Identities in the Context of 
Transnationality and Cultural Globalization’, in: European Journal of Social Theory, 2:1, pp. 71-94. 
Huntington, S. (1992), ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, in: Foreign Affairs, 72:3, pp. 22-49. 
Ichijo, Atsuko and Willfried Spohn (2005) (eds), Entangled identities: nations and Europe, Aldershot, 
Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Kohli, M. (2000), ‘The Battlegrounds of European Identity’, in: European Societies 2(2), pp. 113-137. 
Kraus, P. (2003), ‘Cultural Pluralism and European Polity-Building: Neither Westphalia nor 
Cosmopolis’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 41:4, pp. 665-86. 
— (2004), ‘A union of peoples? Diversity and the predicaments of a multinational polity’, in: L. Dobson 
and A. Follesdal (eds), Political Theory and the European Constitution, London/New York: 
Routledge, pp. 40-55. 
Kubik, J. (2003) ‘Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History Making and Cultural-Political 
Entrepreneurship in Postcommunist Poland and Russia’, in: G. Ekiert and S.E. Hanson (eds), 
Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 317–51. 
Kuus, M. (2004) ‘Europe’s Eastern Enlargement and the Re-Inscription of Otherness in East-Central 
Europe’, in: Progress in Human Geography, 18(4), pp. 1–18. 
Kuzio, T. (2005), ‘Western Multi-Cultural Theory and Practice and its Applicability to the Post-Soviet 
States’, in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 13:2, pp. 221-237. 
 16 
Kymlicka, W. (1995), Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; New York: Oxford University Press. 
— (2001), Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, Oxford University 
Press. 
Kymlicka, W. and M. Opalski (2001) (eds.), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political 
Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press. 
Müller, J.W. (2006), ‘A “Thick” Constitutional Patriotism for the EU? On Morality, Memory and 
Militancy’, in Erik O. Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl (eds) (2006), Law and Democracy 
in the Post-National Union, CIDEL Report, Oslo: Arena, pp. 375-400. 
Neumann, Iver B. (2001), ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus’, in 
Lars-Erik Cederman (ed.), Constructing Europe's identity: the external dimension. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, pp. 141-64. 
Offe, C. (2000), ‘The Democratic Welfare State. A European Regime under the Strain of European 
Integration’, Political Science Series No. 68, Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies. 
Outhwaite, W. (2006), ‘Europe after the EU enlargement. “Cosmopolitanism by small steps“ ’,  in: G. 
Delanty (ed.), Europe and Asia beyond East and West, London: Routledge, pp. 193-202. 
Papanikolaou, A. (2003), ‘Byzantium, Orthodoxy, and Democracy’, in: Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 71(1), pp. 75-98. 
Parekh, B. (2000,) Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire/London: MacMillan. 
Pensky, M. (2000), ‘Cosmopolitanism and the Solidarity Problem: Habermas on National and Cultural 
Identities’, in: Constellations, 7:1, pp. 64-79. 
Rogowski, R. and C. Turner (2006), ‘Europe: Law, Politics, History, Culture’, in: R. Rogowski and C. 
Turner (eds.), The Shape of the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-22. 
Spohn, W. (2002), ‘Transformation Process, Modernization Patterns, and Collective Identities: 
Democratisation, Nationalism, and Religion in Postcommunist Germany, Poland, and Russia’, in: F. 
Bönker, K. Müller and A. Pickel (eds), Postcommunist Transformation and the Social Sciences: Cross-
Disciplinary Approaches, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 199–218. 
— (2005), ‘National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe’, in: K. Eder and W. Spohn 
(eds), Collective memory and European identity: the effects of integration and enlargement, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, pp. 11-24. 
Strath, B. (2000), ‘Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other’, in: B. Strath 
(ed.), Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 391-428. 
— (2003), ‘A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of a Concept’, in: European Journal of Social 
Theory, 5:4, pp. 387-401. 
Troebst, S. (2003), ‘Introduction: What’s in a Historical Region? A Teutonic Perspective’, in: European 
Review of History—Revue europe´enne d’Histoire, Vol 10, No. 2, pp. 173-188. 
Todorova, M. (1997), Imagining the Balkans, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Toggenburg, G. (2004), Gabriel Toggenburg (2004), ‘Unification via Diversification – what does it mean 
to be ‘united in diversity’?’, EUMAP Online Journal, Feature E-day, at 
http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2004/bigday/diversity/. 
— (2006), ‘A Remaining Share or a New Part? The Union’s Role vis-à-vis Minorities After the 
Enlargement Decade’, EUI Working Papers, LAW No. 2006/15, Florence: European University 
Institute. 
Turner, C. (2004), ‘Jürgen Habermas. European or German?’, in: European Journal of Political Theory, 
3: 3, pp. 293-314. 
Verdery, K. (1991), National ideology under socialism. Identity and cultural politics in Ceauescu’s 
Romania, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford: University of California Press. 
Walzer, M. (1994), Thick and thin: moral argument at home and abroad, Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press. 
 17 
— (2002), ‘Nation-States and Immigrant Societies’, in: W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski (2001) (eds.), Can 
Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 150-53. 
Young, I. (1997), ‘A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka’s Ethnic-Nation 
Distinction’, in: Constellations, 4:1, pp. 48-53. 
